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I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitration is a quasi-judicial system with flexible procedural
rules and largely private proceedings used as an alternative to
litigation. 1 Pre-dispute arbitration is the contractual agreement to
arbitrate a dispute before said dispute arises between parties; predispute arbitration is the type of dispute resolution commonly seen
in employment contracts. An agreement to arbitrate may be found
in an employment agreement signed by the employee, but the
agreement is sometimes buried somewhere within other hiring
documents. Alternatively, the arbitration agreement might be found
in the application for employment or the employee handbook. The
negative effects that arbitration has on employees’ rights is a public
policy concern that many businesses ought to closely examine
before utilizing the practice with increasing regularity.
While Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act 2 necessitates
enforcement of arbitration agreements in maritime transactions and
contracts “evidencing a transaction involving commerce,” the clearcut scope of ‘transactions involving commerce’ has not always been
certain.3
Since the 1991 Supreme Court decision of Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane, courts in this country have almost uniformly upheld
enforcement of employment arbitration clauses in the United

1. Jean Murray, The Benefits and Drawbacks of Arbitration, THE
BALANCE:
SMALL
BUSINESS
(July
22,
2019),
https://www.thebalancesmb.com/what-are-the-benefits-and-drawbacks-ofarbitration-398535; Arbitration, WEX, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex.
2. [Hereinafter FAA].
3. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2019); Jon O. Shimabukuro and Jennifer A. Staman, Cong.
Research Serv., R44960, Mandatory Arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act
(2017).
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States.4 Gilmer represented, for the first time, that a statutory civil
rights claim may be subjected to mandatory arbitration.5
Before 1995, there was a split among U.S. courts interpreting
Section 2, with some courts concluding that the FAA applied only
to those contracts where both parties contemplated an interstate
connection. 6 Then, in 1995, the Supreme Court in Allied-Bruce
Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, held in a 7-2 opinion that the
phrase “involving commerce” entails a full exercise of Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause.7
Following these decisions, in 2001, the Court affirmed that the
FAA covers employment disputes that require arbitration to resolve
work-related disputes. 8 In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the
Court held that an employment application which included a
mandatory arbitration provision was not excluded from the FAA’s
coverage following the statute’s exemption clause.9
Since the broadening of “transactions involving commerce”
under Section 2 of the FAA, arbitration practice has been touted as
being cost-effective, time efficient, and confidential. 10 With the
FAA continually preempting any state statute that conflicts in any
way with arbitration, it is very likely that an arbitration clause in an
employment contract will be binding on the employee, thus shutting
out the individual’s constitutional access to the court system due to
the employee signing a contractual waiver within an employment
contract.11
Section 2 of the FAA specifically states that agreements for
arbitration are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
4. Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration,
ECONOMIC
POLICY
INSTITUTE
(Apr.
6,
2018),
https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatory-arbitrationaccess-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60-million-americanworkers/; Gilmer v. Interstate/ Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 38 (1991)
(holding the existence of a manifest liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements).
5. Leona Green, Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Employment Disputes:
A Public Policy Issue in Need of a Legislative Solution, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 173 (1998).
6. Id. at 189.
7. Shimabukuro, supra note 3; Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1995).
8. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001);
Shimabukuro, supra note 3; Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1995).
9. Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. at 109 (2001).
10. Id.; Agreement: Mediation and Arbitration Agreement, SHRM (May 3,
2017),
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/tools-and-samples/hrforms/pages/mediationandarbitrationagreement.aspx
(displaying
sample
employment arbitration agreements typically found in employment contracts); 9
U.S.C. § 2 (2019).
11. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); See also Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 684 So. 2d 102, 106 (Ala. 1995).
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grounds that exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
written contract. 12 Further, arbitration clauses themselves are
severable from the entirety of the contract, so if the employment
contract itself is unenforceable, it is very likely that the arbitration
clause will still be enforceable.13
Empirical evidence shows us that judges in the U.S. are more
likely to compel arbitration than to deny enforcing an arbitration
clause when faced with a motion to compel.14 Thus, it is no surprise
that businesses and the judicial system favor arbitration as a form of
alternative dispute resolution to resolve claims efficiently and keep
them out of the already clogged judicial system.15
For employees, this prospect is incredibly intimidating. For
example, in the context of asserting a statutory discrimination claim
against a corporate employer with extensive bargaining power, it is
easy to see how an employee might bite the bullet rather than make
the claim.
Part I discusses the potential business incentives to use
arbitration and to include agreements to arbitrate within employee
contracts. Part II reviews the ethical considerations and drawbacks
to implementing mandatory arbitration in employment law disputes,
especially as it pertains to statutory discrimination and harassment
claims. Part III includes considerations for businesses when
confronted with the decision to include an arbitration agreement in
employment contracts, as well as some guidelines for drafting
arbitration clauses to mitigate policy concerns. The analysis
concludes with a discussion of best practices for businesses to
consider when they decide to include arbitration clauses in their
employment contracts, in light of the benefits and ethical
considerations in the advent of the #MeToo movement.16
12. Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casorotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (holding that the
Montana statute at issue was in direct conflict with the FAA, thus the Montana
law was preempted by federal law), See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2019).
13. Amy Endicott, et al., United States: Arbitration, THE LEGAL 500 & THE
IN-HOUSE
LAWYER:
COMPARATIVE
LEGAL
GUIDE
(2017),
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2017/11/comparativ
e-legal-guide-united-states-arbitration.
14. Robert Gebeloff et al., Removing the Ability to Sue, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31,
2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/10/30/business/dealbook/arbitrationtrends.html.
15. Roger Haydock et al., Arbitration and Judicial Civil Justice: An
American Historical Review and a Proposal for a Private/Arbitral and Public/
Judicial Partnership, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 141,145 (2002).
16. History & Vision, ME TOO, https://metoomvmt.org/about/ (last visited
Jan. 12, 2020) (describing that the #MeToo movement started in 2006 as a grass
roots movement to help young women and girls, particularly Black women and
girls, who are survivors of sexual violence; after the spread of the #MeToo
movement on Twitter, the movement began a universal conversation about the
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II. BUSINESS INCENTIVES FOR USING MANDATORY ARBITRATION
Given the history of judicial enforceability of arbitration
agreements in the U.S., it is no wonder many corporations and
businesses use the clauses to their advantage.17
A. Epic Systems Framework
In the 2018 case, Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that employment agreements that require employees to
arbitrate disputes individually do not violate the National Labor
Relations Act.18 The Court held that nothing in the National Labor
Relations Act19 guaranteed class and collective action procedures.20
The majority in Epic Systems agreed that the Congressional intent
of the NLRA appeared to be the desire to create equality of
bargaining power in the workplace between employees and
management by protecting the right to unionize and engage in
collective bargaining.21
Some have seen the Epic Systems ruling as yet another
illustration of the decreasing power of employees in the U.S.
political system. 22 Others, including many businesses who utilize
arbitration agreements, viewed the Court’s decision in Epic Systems
as a return to the freedom of contract in employment law.23
The Epic Systems rule makes it far more likely that employees
simply will not pursue low-value claims or individual claims in
general.24 The practical result is incredibly beneficial to employers
fight for women, girls, and trans individuals to experience a life free of prevalent
sexual and domestic violence).
17. Are Employee Arbitration Agreements Right for You? Some Pros and
Cons
to
Consider,
STOEL
RIVES,
LLP
(June
6,
2018),
https://www.stoel.com/legal-insights/legal-updates/are-employee-arbitrationagreements-right-for-you.
18. Id; Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1629 (2018).
19. [Hereinafter NLRA].
20. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct., at 1629 (2018).
21. Benjamin Robbins, Symposium: The Federal Arbitration Act and the
National Labor Relations Act are Two Ships That Pass in the Night,
SCOTUSBLOG
(May
21,
2018),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/05/symposium-the-federal-arbitration-actand-the-national-labor-relations-act-are-two-ships-that-pass-in-the-night/.
22. Case Comment, Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 132 HARV. L. REV. 427,
427 (2018).
23. Charlotte Garden, Epic Systems v. Lewis: The Return of Freedom of
Contract in Work Law, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, https://www.acslaw.org/analysis/acssupreme-court-review/epic-systems-v-lewis-the-return-of-freedom-of-contractin-work-law/.
24. Id; Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. 1612,1624 (2018) (“Seeking to demonstrate
an irreconcilable statutory conflict . . . the employees point to Section 7 of the
NLRA. That provision guarantees workers ‘the right to self-organization, to form,
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who wish to be virtually immune from claims brought by their
employees.25
Mandatory arbitration procedures allow employers to require all
non-unionized employees to agree, as a condition of employment,
that any individual statutory claims or other litigable claims will be
governed by private arbitration rather than through the public court
system. 26 Once the substantive and procedural differences of
arbitration are understood, it is fairly simple to see why many
employers choose the privacy and speed of arbitration over the
publicity and comparative difficulty of litigating the same claims.27
B. Privacy
First, there is significant employer and employee privacy in
arbitration, and many companies prefer arbitration based on this fact
alone.28 Open court proceedings may expose corporate misconduct
directly on the public record; in contrast, via arbitration,
corporations can protect their reputation to an extent and keep
potential wrongdoings private and out of the public view.29
The process does not allow complete privacy, but rather a
heightened level of privacy as compared to open court
proceedings. 30 Employment arbitration in the United States is
private, rather than completely confidential in nature.31 While the
public cannot attend an arbitration hearing, and arbitrators and
administrators are precluded from disclosing any information about
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choosing. . .’ From this language, the employees ask us to infer a
clear and manifest congressional command to displace the Arbitration Act and
outlaw agreements like theirs. Section 7 focuses on the right to organize unions
and bargain collectively. It may permit unions to prohibit arbitration. . . But it
does not express approval or disapproval of arbitration. It does not mention class
or collective action procedures. It does not even hint at a wish to displace the
Arbitration Act- let alone accomplish that much clearly and manifestly, as our
precedents demand.”)
25. Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1629 (2018).
26. Alexander Colvin, et al., Individual Employment Rights Arbitration in
the United States: Actors and Outcomes, 68 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV., 68(5),
1019, 1020 (2015).
27. E. Norman Veasey, The Conundrum of the Arbitration vs. Litigation
Decision,
AM .
BAR
ASS’N.
(Sept.
19,
2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2015/12/07_
veasey/.
28. Id.
29. Christopher R. Drahozal, Confidentiality in Consumer and Employment
Arbitration, 7 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 28, 29 (2015) (quoting Myriam Gilles,
The Demise of Deterrence: Mandatory Arbitration and the “Litigation Forum”
Movement 17 (2014)) (paper presented to the State Appellate Court Judges at
Pound Civil Justice Institute 2014 Forum).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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the arbitration, the parties are free to disclose any information,
unless a non-disclosure agreement binds them as part of the
agreement to arbitrate.32
Further, the parties would need to publicly disclose an
arbitration award when the party seeks to enforce an arbitration
award in court.33 Most courts throughout the U.S. will refuse to issue
an award where the award is under seal, so the award on which the
court relies will typically need to remain public. 34
The privacy of arbitration guarantees considerably less negative
media attention to companies as a result of potentially damaging
claims such as sexual harassment or whistleblower claims. 35 It is
clear, then, that arbitration serves as an incredible benefit for
businesses who wish to preserve their public image or have already
been entrenched in media displays and desire a way to quickly and
quietly settle their employee disputes.36
As an example, Dov Charney, the founder of American Apparel,
kept countless corporate misgivings out of the public eye by
requiring employees to sign arbitration and confidentiality
agreements.37 Investors in American Apparel, as well as the public,
were kept in the dark for years concerning the allegations of sexual
harassment against Charney.38 The board of American Apparel was
aggressive about using arbitration clauses to the advantage of the
company. The allegations against Charney would likely have
become known to the public much earlier had it not been for
requiring employees to enter arbitration and requiring those same
employees to sign confidentiality agreements regarding any
settlement reached. 39 Some argue that without arbitration
agreements, American Apparel models’ sexual harassment
allegations against Charney would have been released earlier.40
Those critiquing arbitration clauses argue the confidentiality
provisions instituted by the company were the actual mechanisms
used to silence the employees. 41 Regardless of which legal
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Dennis J. Alessi, Arbitration of Employment Disputes? Let’s Have
Another
Look!,
PRIMERUS,
https://www.primerus.com/business-lawarticles/arbitration-of-employment-disputes-lets-have-another-look10152013.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2020).
36. Id.
37. Steven Solomon, Arbitration Clauses Let American Apparel Hide
Misconduct,
N.Y.
TIMES:
DEALBOOK
(July
15,
2014),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/07/15/arbitration-clauses-let-americanapparel-hide-misconduct/.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Drahozal, supra note 29, at 31.
41. Id.
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mechanism controlled the outcome, arbitration along with
confidentiality provisions allowed the corporation to take more time
internally to probe the allegations before the board ultimately
decided to oust Charney. 42 While controversial, arbitration
confidentiality may be beneficial for companies and corporations
who want to buy time for their in-house legal counsel to investigate
alleged misconduct and allow their lawyers to address the issue
internally before the public catches wind, with the resulting
publicity ultimately negatively affecting sales or revenue.
Businesses often have an interest in keeping arbitration
outcomes confidential for a number of reasons: to protect secret
commercial or scientific information, to protect the company’s
reputation, to avoid revelation of certain business strategies, and to
not upset customers with a public display of problems with an
employee or group of employees.43
C. Providing a Realistic Path for Employees
Another incentive for arbitration in the business employment
law context is that without employment arbitration, many claims
filed by employees would not attract the attention of private lawyers
because the stakes are too small, and outcomes may be uncertain.44
Many plaintiffs’ attorneys are incredibly selective about the
cases they choose to take on due to the unpredictability of jury
awards and the difficulty of facing a corporate or big business
adversary.45 As a result, without arbitration, many employee claims
would be filed with administrative agencies that ultimately often do
not have the resources to litigate for the employee.46 For example,
in order for employees to file a discrimination lawsuit against their
employer, they must first file an Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) claim and then obtain a right to sue letter;
however, a similar requirement does not exist for most private
arbitration proceedings.47
42. Andrea Chang & Shan Li, American Apparel Says Misconduct Led to
Founder Dov Charney’s Ouster, L.A. TIMES (June 19, 2014),
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-0619-american-apparel-20140619story.html.
43. Veasey, supra note 27.
44. Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 559,
563-566 (2001); see also, Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination
Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 556, 556-75 (2001).
45. Id. at 563
46. Id.
47. Lisa Nagele-Piazza, Must an Employee File an EEOC Discrimination
Charge
Before
a
Lawsuit?,
SHRM
(Apr.
26,
2019),
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/employment-
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The EEOC,48 for example, is so backlogged and underfunded
that it has begun closing cases without even investigating them.49
Part of this is due to the fact that since the 1980s, the U.S. workforce
has grown by fifty percent, yet Congress has kept the EEOC’s
funding relatively flat.50 Administrative agencies are proving to be
a difficult place for employees to bring their claims and to litigate
them. 51 A study by Lex Machina shows that from January 2009
through July 2017, of the 54,810 federal employment discrimination
and harassment cases that were filed and closed, employees who
brought suit won only 584 times in trial (roughly one percent total),
while employers won 7,518 of those cases (about fourteen percent),
and another 3,883 of those cases were settled on procedural grounds,
many dismissing the employees’ claims.52
The employees that are most likely to obtain a more desirable
settlement from a strictly litigation-based system are those who are
represented by competent, often high-paid, counsel. 53 Employees
who elect to represent themselves in a lawsuit against a business or
those who retain less-than-desirable counsel will be faced with an
unpredictable litigation proceeding and jury trial against a business
with tremendous bargaining power in the same arena.54 Even if the
employee does get the employment case to the jury, the cases are
often still very hard to prove.

law/pages/must-an-employee-file-an-eeoc-discrimination-charge-before-alawsuit.aspx; [hereinafter EEOC]; see also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 122 S.
Ct. 754 (2002) (holding that an agreement between a private employer and
employee to arbitrate employment-related disputes does not bar EEOC from
pursuing victim-specific judicial relief in enforcement action alleging that
employer violated Americans with Disabilities Act); EEOC NOTICE: NUMBER
915-060, U.S. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n (Aug. 29, 1990),
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/arbitration-age.cfm (Reiterating the fact
that while an individual may agree to arbitration, they may not be coerced into
arbitration, and despite an arbitration agreement, the employee retains the ability
to file a discrimination claim against their employer via the EEOC. The
Commission takes the position that ADEA claims, for example, cannot be waived
by arbitration).
48. Id.
49. Maryam Jameel, More and More Workplace Discrimination Cases are
Being Closed Before They’re Even Investigated, VOX (June 14, 2019),
https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/6/14/18663296/congress-eeoc-workplacediscrimination.
50. Sean Captain, Workers Win Only 1% of Federal Civil Rights Lawsuits at
Trial,
FAST
COMPANY
(July
31,
2017),
https://www.fastcompany.com/40440310/employees-win-very-few-civil-rightslawsuits.
51. Id.
52. Id. (likely settlement of claims making up the remaining 78% of claims).
53. Estreicher, supra note 44, at 563; see also, Selmi, supra note 44, at 556.
54. Id.
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D. No Jury Trial
Arbitration guarantees the lack of a jury trial, which can be
extremely beneficial for companies. Additionally, arbitration
proceedings rarely award punitive damages.55
For example, New York Courts held in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart,
Inc., that the judiciary is better equipped than arbitrators to
determine punitive damages.56 Garrity held that an arbitrator has no
power to award punitive damages, even if the parties agree, and that
damages of this sort are reserved to the courts as a matter of public
policy.57
Further, limiting employee access to the courts via arbitration
allows employers to decrease the possibility of a strenuous payout
to an employee at a jury trial. A recent federal sexual harassment
jury trial in New York State resulted in a $13 million award against
the employer, including $11 million in punitive damages under Title
VII and New York State Human Rights Law.58 Awards like these
are intimidating to even the most wealthy corporations, and for this
reason, more employers are reaching for the arbitral forum in their
employment contracts.
E. Flexibility
With the procedural rules of arbitration being governed by
contract or by the chosen arbitration forum, such as American
Arbitration Association, businesses are afforded the luxury of being
able to “shop around” to the extent necessary to find procedural
arbitration rules which are most favorable to their company and
interests. Since the ruling in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
even if state law prohibits the arbitration of a particular claim, the
FAA preempts this law, so therefore the claim is arbitrable despite
the conflicting state law. 59 This decision makes it relatively
effortless for businesses to creatively craft employment arbitration
55. James Hadden, The Authority of Arbitrators to Award Punitive
Damages: Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business System, 7 OHIO ST. J. DIS. RES.
337-350 (1992); see also Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 793 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1976).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Eric Bachman, $13 Million Awarded in Sexual Harassment Jury Trial,
ZUCKERMAN LAW (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.zuckermanlaw.com/glass-ceilingdiscrimination-law-blog/13-million-awarded-sexual-harassment-jury-trial/; see
also Mayo-Coleman v. Am. Sugar Holding, Inc., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94164,
at *1-7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2015).
59. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 342 (2011); see also
Jon Berkelhammer, Arbitration: A Comparison of the Pros and Cons, ELLIS &
WINTERS LLP (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.elliswinters.com/updates/arbitration-acomparison-of-the-pros-and-cons#_ftn1.
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agreements and rarely have them disturbed. The parties (and
typically the business, since they’re crafting the employment
agreement) have the freedom to define what claims will be
arbitrated, when they will be arbitrated, and how the process will
proceed.60
Further, the procedural flexibility of arbitration allows company
executives to be more easily accommodated since the public court
system often has busy calendars and is often stacked with cases.61 In
the public court system, the attorneys, plaintiffs and defendants are
often at the mercy of the judge’s discretion as far as how the case
will proceed and what the schedule will look like. Arbitration allows
corporations to choose the location, timing, and rules governing
each proceeding.
F. Limited Appeal
Section 2 of the FAA provides that arbitration agreements “shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”62
And under Section 10 of the FAA, an arbitration award can only
be vacated: (1) where the award was procured by fraud; (2) where
there was partiality or corruption evident in any of the arbitrators;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing for sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence material to a controversy; or another misbehavior by
which the rights of a party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award was not made.63
Thus, when courts do review arbitration awards by employers,
they will not vacate an award for simple errors in judgment or
mistakes of law: the errors must be truly significant and apparent on

60. Id.
61. Veasey, supra note 27.
62. Validity, Irrevocability, and Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate of
2019, 9 U.S.C.S. § 2 (2019). (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through Public Law
116056, approved Aug. 23, 2019) (“A written provision in maritime transaction
or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal
to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or
refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”); see also, Beth Rowe,
COMMENT: Binding Arbitration of Employment Disputes: Opposing PreDispute Agreements, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 921, 924 (1996).
63. Hon. Fred Foreman, et al., To Arbitrate or to Not Arbitrate- That is the
Question, ILL. ST. B. ASS’N: BENCH & B. (June 2017),
https://www.isba.org/sections/bench/newsletter/2017/06/toarbitrateortonotarbitra
tethatisth.
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the face of the award.64 This is a high threshold. It is because of this
high threshold that arbitration awards are rarely disturbed. 65
Arbitration awards are also rarely disturbed based on the Supreme
Court’s policy liberally favoring arbitration agreements.66
Errors of fact or law are insufficient to vacate an award; this is
likely due to the very nature of binding arbitration, and how it differs
from other forms of ADR because, similar to litigation, arbitration
is an adjudicatory process where the arbitrator’s decision is binding
upon the participants.67 The grounds for overturning or vacating an
arbitrator’s decision are so limited that they essentially deny parties
the right to an appeal.68
G. No Requirement for Reasoned Award
Another advantage is the lack of a written opinion, which
contributes to the confidentiality aspect discussed above. 69
Arbitrators are free to issue arbitration awards without ever issuing
a written opinion, furthering the veil of secrecy favorable to the
defendant.70 Even if a party desires a written transcript, they may be
difficult, if not impossible to acquire.71
H. Legislation Protecting Confidentiality
Arkansas, California, Missouri, and Texas have legislated
specific statutory protection for arbitration communications. 72 In
other states, case law provides similar confidentiality protection.73
In states with legislation and case law designed to protect the
confidentiality of arbitration proceedings, courts are more likely to
64. Id.
65. David Taylor, Using Binding Arbitration to Resolve Construction
Disputes,
BRADLEY
(Oct.
2,
2014),
https://www.bradley.com/insights/publications/2014/10/david-taylor-usingbinding-arbitration-to-resolv.
66. Foreman, supra note 63.
67. Rowe, supra note 62, at 924.
68. Id. at 936.
69. Id. at 938.
70. Id.
71. Kathryn Miller, Issues in Arbitration of Employment Cases, MLC
GROUP
P.C.
(Apr.
22,
2015),
http://www.mlgrouppc.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/Issues-in-Arbitration-of-Employment-Cases.pdf
(describing how according to AAA rules, the party requesting a transcript is
required to pay all fees associated with the transcript).
72. Laura Kaster, Confidentiality in U.S. Arbitration, 5. N.Y. DISP. RES.
LAW. 23, 25 (2012).
73. Id; Bjc Health Sys. v. Grp. Health Plan, 30 S.W.3d 198 (Mo. Ct. App.
2000) (holding that “no admission, representation, statement, or other confidential
communication made in setting up or conducting such [arbitration] proceedings
not otherwise discoverable or obtainable shall be admissible as evidence or
subject to discovery” based on the Missouri statute).
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be favorably disposed to parties seeking relief from the production
of arbitration documents within discovery. 74 Given the differing
levels of support that state jurisdictions have regarding arbitration,
the choice of law provision in an arbitration agreement can be
drafted strategically.
I. Speed
Together, the procedural differences of arbitration and litigation
often allow the arbitration process to resolve a dispute with more
economy than the litigation process. Litigation of an employee
claims, including appeals, could extend upwards of eight years,
whereas the Institute for Civil Justice of the Rand Corporation found
that the average arbitration decision is reached in approximately 8.6
months.75
Moreover, allowing flexibility in the procedural schedule of
arbitration means that businesses have more time to focus on the
ordinary course of business, as opposed to defending against
employee discrimination claims. The flexibility of arbitration may
also mean that the business can allocate more time and resources to
decreasing the likelihood that an employee will bring discrimination
or harassment claims. Additional funds could be allocated to the
human resources or legal department to ensure that the business is
complying with federal statutory discrimination claims and ensuring
that other employees and supervisors are educated on the internal
and legal repercussions of discriminating against or harassing other
employees.
J. Predictability
Further, given the legal climate in the years since Gilmer and
progeny, more corporate counsel and businesses are mandating
employment arbitration upon the assurance that the courts will
enforce the arbitration agreement if a motion to compel is brought.76
74. Kaster, supra note 72, at 25.
75. Rowe, supra note 62, at 934; see also, Gary G. Mathiason & Pavneet
Singh Uppal, Evaluating and Using Employer-Initiated Arbitration Policies and
Agreements: Preparing the Workplace for the Twenty-First Century, C902 ALIABA 875, 894 (1994) (citing a Civil Justice study by the Rand Corporation’s
institute finding that the average processing time from complaint to decision in
arbitration is about 8.6 months along with 20% cost savings to respective parties).
76. Charles Coleman, Is Mandatory Arbitration Living Up to Its
Expectations? A View from the Employer’s Perspective, AM. B. ASS’N:
ALTERNATIVE DISP. RESOL. (June 4, 2018), http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/lelannualcle/09/materials/data/papers/015.pdf; Gilmer v. Interstate/ Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that a claim under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C.S. § 621 et seq., could be subjected to binding,
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Employers are comfortable mandating arbitration in employment
contracts with employees, as it has become apparent that the law and
the FAA protect arbitration agreements entered into by employers
outside of the transportation industry.77 Indeed, the Supreme Court
restated its approval of mandatory employment arbitration more
recently in Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, holding that a collectivebargaining agreement entered into by union members mandating
arbitration was fully enforceable under federal law even where the
union members alleged age discrimination under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967.78
Another procedural advantage which enhances the speed of
arbitration proceedings is that arbitrators are not generally required
to “find facts” in the traditional judicial sense, justify awards, or
even describe the process by which they arrived at their decisions.79
K. An Effective Disincentive to Bring Claims
Finally, the last consideration in the inclusion of mandatory
arbitration provisions is the potential advantage to corporate
counsel. Top corporations such as NCR, AT&T, U.S. West, Bank of
America, and Chevron will evaluate lawyers and contract managers
on the basis of how many disputes were avoided, what costs were
saved, and the creation of solutions intended to preserve existing
business relationships as opposed to evaluating based on an
attorney’s record of lawsuits won.80 It is clear to see why corporate
counsel would recommend incorporation of mandatory arbitration
on employees, to the extent that the law allows it.81
Each year, some sixty million American employees will enter
into mandatory arbitration provisions with their employers; of that
number, approximately 6,000 employment arbitration cases are
filed.82 Thus, only one in about 10,400 employees subject to binding
arbitration actually will file a claim under the procedures each
year. 83 New York University of Law Professor Cynthia Estlund
compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities
registration application); Circuit City (holding that a contract of adhesion, or
standard-form contract, drafted by the employer with superior bargaining power
which doesn’t allow the party to modify the agreement whatsoever, and as a
prerequisite for the job was procedurally unconscionable).
77. Id.
78. Id.; 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 274 (2009).
79. Rowe, supra note 62, at 933.
80. Todd Carver & Albert Vondra, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Why it
Doesn’t Work and Why it Does, HARV. BUS. REV. (May-June 1994),
https://hbr.org/1994/05/alternative-dispute-resolution-why-it-doesnt-work-andwhy-it-does).
81. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 4.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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compared arbitration filing rates to employment case filing rates in
federal and state court and found that if employees bound by
mandatory arbitration filed claims at the same rate as in court, there
would be anywhere from 206,000 to 468,000 claims filed annually,
or thirty-five to eighty times the current actual rate of claims filed
by employees subject to binding arbitration.84
With the obvious effect of binding mandatory arbitration
keeping employee discrimination and harassment claims from being
brought, corporate attorneys are celebrated for utilizing ADR
policies that have the effect of lessening the amount of litigation a
company is faced with.85 However, binding mandatory arbitration is
criticized in this nation for being contrary to public policy concerns
relative to worker’s rights in this nation; it is nonetheless clear that
as a form of self-preservation, many attorneys in the corporate
context will advocate for the procedure as a claim-limiting
mechanism.
Discussion of the business benefits of mandatory employment
arbitration discussed throughout this section are, of course, nonexhaustive; arguably, there are other benefits specific to individual
companies, depending in large part on their industry and the type of
employee disputes that are typically brought within that industry.
The predictability, uniformity, flexibility, privacy, relative ease,
favorable legal environment, avoidance of jury trial, limited appeal,
and disincentive of litigation are all factors that make arbitration an
easy choice for many businesses. However, in the wake of the
#MeToo movement and other public policy concerns, many
companies may want to take a close look at their binding arbitration
employment procedures and reevaluate if and how to implement
these clauses in employment contracts.
III. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND DRAWBACKS OF COMPANY
IMPLEMENTATION OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION IN
EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS
This section discusses some of the ethical and public policy
concerns of implementing mandatory arbitration agreements as they
relate to employees. Business ethics and public policy in recent
years have been increasingly intertwined. 86 In the wake of the
84. Id; Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C.
L. REV. 679, 689-694 (2018) (comparing arbitration claims filed to federal and
state court filing numbers).
85. John Allison, Five Ways to Keep Disputes Out of Court, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Jan.-Feb. 1990), https://hbr.org/1990/01/five-ways-to-keep-disputes-outof-court.
86. Jenny Abel, Strategy Beyond Markets: The Intersection of Business,
Public Policy and Ethics, UVA DARDEN: IDEAS TO ACTION (Mar. 23, 2017),
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#MeToo movement, for example, businesses have rushed to ensure
they comply with Title IX and other federal laws.87 As a contextual
example, Kate Upton accused Guess co-founder Paul Marciano of
sexual harassment on Twitter and within hours after her tweet,
Guess’ company shares dropped almost eighteen percent. 88 These
facts alone demonstrate that claims against a company’s public
image or corporate officers often damage the company
reputationally and financially, sometimes irreparably.89
Non-market pressures, such as public policy and media
coverage, can have just as immense of an effect on a company’s
brand as can core business issues such as supply and demand. 90
Perhaps more so now than ever, businesses are engaging in more
transparent practices and increasing their online presence in a
variety of new ways, such as social media, in order to retain their
markets and increase business.91
With so many businesses acutely aware of and impacted by their
public image and reputation, and so many employees increasingly
critical and aware of their employer’s core ethical system,
businesses would be wise to urgently consider public policy
concerns posed by binding arbitration.
A. Corporations Begin Limiting Arbitration in Response to
Employee Demands
Some companies are finding themselves involved in public
scandals related to mandatory arbitration.92 In 2019, Google became
https://ideas.darden.virginia.edu/strategy-beyond-markets-the-intersection-ofbusiness-public-policy-and-ethics (discussing the nonmarket forces such as
human rights, government regulation, environmental activism, and other special
interests group which have created a need for businesses to develop a different
and proactive approach to these pressures and factors).
87. Sachin Bave, Companies Reopening Old Cases, Seek Legal Opinion
Fearing
#MeToo
Blow,
ECON.
TIMES
(Oct.
11,
2018),
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/company/corporatetends/companies-reopening-old-cases-seek-legal-opinion-fearing-metooblow/articleshow/66157.cms?from=mdr (discussing how many corporations are
revisiting cases and interviewing women in each department to discuss any sexual
harassment that is or may have taken place within the workplace).
88. Samantha Cooney, Companies are Losing Millions After #MeToo
Allegations Like Kate Upton’s Claim Against Guess’ Paul Marciano, TIME (Feb.
2, 2018), https://time.com/5130340/kate-upton-guess-stock-price/.
89. Robert Eccles et al., Reputation and Its Risks, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb.
2007), https://hbr.org/2007/02/reputation-and-its-risks.
90. See Abel, supra note 86.
91. See David S. Sherwyn & J. Bruce Tracey, Mandatory Arbitration of
Employment Disputes: Implications for Policy and Practice, 42(5) CORNELL
HOTEL & RESTAURANT ADMIN. Q. 60-71 (2001).
92. Alexia Campbell, Google Employees Fought for Their Right to Sue the
Company--and
Won,
VOX
(Feb.
22,
2019),
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the latest company to end mandatory arbitration for employees in
response to employee pressure and protests.93
This decision came after Google decided to end arbitration for
sexual harassment claims made against Google’s employees in
2018.94 Google employees demanded a public report on the number
of sexual harassment complaints made against Google employees
and the outcomes of those claims.
Google responded by declaring it would begin to keep more
detailed reports of these complaints, the trends thereof, and
subsequent disciplinary action. 95 Google’s policy response came
only after employee revolution and protest. This protest was largely
inevitable when employees began to understand that their
fundamental constitutional rights, specifically the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial, was potentially being limited by
their contractual agreement to arbitrate any dispute they may have
with their employer.96
B. National Balancing Decision for Judicial Enforceability
Undoubtedly, the nation’s high court has struggled with “where
and when” to enforce binding mandatory arbitration against
employees who have signed these agreements due to a lack of
employer-employee bargaining power. Thus, a national balancing
decision has been presented, weighing the benefits of arbitration
with the public policy issues raised by the practice.
In Epic Systems, the Supreme Court struggled with the question
of arbitration enforceability, and the dissent voiced these concerns
as the more liberal members of the Court have for decades.97 Epic
Systems was adjudicated in 2018 and added to the litany of proarbitration rulings, holding that an arbitration agreement in an
employment contract calling for individualized proceedings was to
https://vox.com/technology/2019/2/22/18236172/mandatory-forced-arbitrationgoogle-employees.
93. Id.
94. Id.; see also Alexia Campbell, Google Announces Changes to Sexual
Harassment Policies After Global Employee Walkout, VOX (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/2018/11/8/18075840/google-ceo-announces-sexualharassment-policy.
95. Id.
96. Campbell, Google Announces Changes to Sexual Harassment Policies
After Global Employee Walkout, supra note 94; Edward Brunet, Arbitration and
Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 81-120 (1992).
97. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); see also Charlotte
Garden, Epic Systems v. Lewis: The Return of Freedom of Contract in Work Law?,
AM. CONST. SOC’Y, https://www.acslaw.org/analysis/acs-supreme-courtreview/epic-systems-v-lewis-the-return-of-freedom-of-contract-in-work-law/;
Garrett Epps, An Epic Supreme Court Decision on Employment, THE ATLANTIC
(May 22, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/05/an-epicsupreme-court-decision-on-employment/560963/.
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be enforced under the FAA because the National Labor Relations
Act was not in conflict with the FAA; thus, the statutory claim could
be adjudicated under the arbitration agreement signed.98
In her dissent, Justice Ginsberg wrote, “[t]he FAA’s legislative
history also shows that Congress did not intend the statute to apply
to arbitration provisions in employment contracts.” 99 Ginsberg
continued, “[t]he inevitable result of today’s decision will be the
underenforcement of federal and state statutes designed to advance
the well-being of vulnerable workers.”100 The dissent emphasized
the lack of mutuality in such agreements, as well as the fact that
employees are in subordinate positions when compared with their
large, corporate employers with extensive bargaining power. 101
There is a resulting unspoken truth stemming from the decision in
Epic Systems: inevitably, arbitration contacts in employment
contracts will likely begin to appear with striking regularity.102
C. Lack of Bargaining Power
Stevens’s dissent in the Gilmer cases also displays the judicial
concern for the lack of bargaining power in employee arbitration
agreements as a matter of policy. 103 Stevens’s dissent in Gilmer
declares: “In my opinion, arbitration clauses contained in
employment agreements are specifically exempt from coverage of
the FAA.”104
Stevens went on to quote the late Justice Burger:
Plainly, it would not comport with the congressional
objectives behind a statute seeking to enforce civil
rights protected by Title VII to allow the very forces
that had practiced discrimination to contract away
the right to enforce civil rights in the courts. For
federal courts to defer to arbitral decisions reached
by the same combination of forces that had long
perpetuated invidious discrimination would have
made the foxes guardians of the chickens.105

98. Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1627.
99. Id. at 1643.
100. Id. at 1646.
101. Epps, supra note 97.
102. Id.
103. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 36-43 (1991)
(holding that a claim brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
could be subjected to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement
in a securities registration application).
104. Id. at 36.
105. Id. at 42.
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This begs the question: to what extent should courts defer to
corporate drafters of arbitration agreements meant to be held against
employees? 106 This unfair bargaining power is reflected in
ubiquitous take-it-or-leave-it contracts, and corporations will almost
inevitably forbid their employees from negotiating an arbitration
clause or forbid them to continue employment without conceding to
its terms.107
D. Did the Employee Meaningfully Consent to the Clause?
The non-consensual nature of arbitration agreements evokes
another public policy concern.108 This critique stems from the fact
that many employees do not typically read or understand arbitration
clauses, and often are not given the option to opt-out of them.109
Studies show that only a small fraction of adults and employees read
legal forms and an even smaller percentage understand them.110
This is problematic given the fact that courts are likely to view
arbitration clauses as enforceable because the judiciary views them
almost uniformly as a bargained-for element of the contract.111
However, many employees lack the legal knowledge and
background to understand what constitutes arbitration and how their
assent might limit their rights, making it difficult to view this
process as an informed decision to consent to arbitration as a matter
of public policy.112
This concern has evoked litigation, especially in the tech-age,
however, courts continue to favor arbitration as well as the notion
that effective notice was given, even on a cell phone screen. 113 In
106. Jeffrey Salas, Unequal Bargaining Power: Navigating Arbitration
Clauses,
WIS.
LAW.,
https://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx
?Volume=87&Issue=10&ArticleID=23654; see also Michael Green, Opposing
Excessive Use of Employer Bargaining Power in Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements Through Collective Employee Actions, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV.
77, 80-84 (2003).
107. Imre Szalai et al., The Widespread Use of Workplace Arbitration Among
America’s Top 100 Companies, THE EMP. RTS. ADVOC. INST. (Mar. 2018),
http://employeerightsadvocacy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NELAInstitute-Report-Widespread-Use-of-Workplace-Arbitration-March-2018.pdf.
108. Marsha Levinson, Note, Mandatory Arbitration: How the Current
System Perpetuates Sexual Harassment Cultures in the Workplace, 59 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 485, 492 (2019).
109. Id.; Alan M. White & Cathy L. Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 233 (2002); see also Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for
New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ.
L. REV. 1039, 1059–60 (1998).
110. Id.
111. Id.; Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991).
112. Levinson, supra note 108, at 492.
113. Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2017).
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the 2017 Meyer v. Uber Techs case, the Second Circuit held that an
electronic “click” will suffice to signify acceptance of contract
terms, as long as the layout and language of the site gives the user
reasonable notice that a click will manifest assent to an agreement,
an arbitration agreement in this case. 114 The court opined that
despite the fact that Meyer’s assent to arbitration was not express, it
was “unambiguous in light of the objectively reasonable notice of
the terms,” and that was enough for him to be bound by the contract
term of arbitration.115
Anecdotally, this prompts the question of how often users of
electronic devices are meaningfully, or even consciously,
consenting to electronic agreements due to the rapid nature with
which users click on screens.116 Whether this matters for reasons of
legality appears to be a moot point as expressed by Meyer, yet it still
demands consideration from a public policy standpoint.117
E. Employee Difficulty with Financial and Procedural
Implications
Yet another public policy implication for businesses wishing to
continue or begin to implement binding mandatory arbitration are
the considerable procedural and financial difficulties faced by
employees wishing to file a claim. 118 While litigation itself is
procedurally strenuous, arbitration poses its own, unique difficulties
for the average worker in the United States.119 When the agreement
itself is likely to have been drafted by the employer, thus favoring
the employer in terms of where and how the arbitration will proceed,
employees must submit to the drafter’s preferences.120 This fact is
concerning as a matter of public policy because the average
employee has less revenue to commute across the country for an
arbitration near corporate headquarters than would the corporation
itself.
Further, many arbitration agreements require the employee to
split the cost of arbitration with the employer, which may lend itself
114. Id. at 79.
115. Id.
116. Chaelin Ra, Association of Digital Media Use with Subsequent
Symptoms of Attention-Deficit/ Hyperactivity Disorder Among Adolescents, JAMA
(2018), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/fullarticle/2687861.
117. Meyer, 868 F.3d 66 at 80.
118. Sean Captain, Workers Win Only 1% of Federal Civil Rights Lawsuits at
Trial,
FAST
COMPANY
(July
31,
2017),
https://www.fastcompany.com/40440310/employees-win-very-few-civil-rightslawsuits.
119. Lisa Nagele-Piazza, Unaffordable Justice: The High Cost of Mandatory
Employment Arbitration for the Average Worker, 23 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 39,
39-68 (2014).
120. Id. at 42.
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to being cost-prohibitive for the average U.S. employee.121 Courts
are split as to whether arbitral cost-sharing arrangements are valid,
with some courts enforcing these cost splitting arrangements and
other courts ruling that the employer alone should pay the costs.122
Regardless, the filing costs for employees making a claim via
arbitration is not the only fee involved in the arbitration process,
especially when you consider high attorney’s fees for employees.123
These fees, which may or may not be split with the employer or paid
for by the employer, will also include an arbitrator’s per diem, or
hourly rate: fees at the beginning of the process and substantial costs
upon conclusion of the arbitration.124 One estimate showed that the
average cost of arbitrating an employment claim from start to finish
was around $20,000.00.125
F. Employee Unconscious Waiver of Rights
The next ethical consideration for businesses is the potential
absence of constitutional rights for employees in private arbitration
proceedings. 126 Especially when viewed from the lens that these
agreements may not be truly consented to by the employee, many
critics see forced arbitration in employment as a potential violation
of the Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury. 127 This is a
persuasive argument since, as discussed supra, Section D, many
adult employees will not read their contract agreements for
employment and might be signing to terms without understanding
or fully assenting to having their Seventh Amendment right waived.
The tension in this argument is found in the fact that businesses
also have a constitutional right to make contracts.128 In the same
121. Nagele-Piazza, supra note 119, at 42; see Lorene D. Park, Cost-Based
Challenge to Arbitration Fails, WOLTERS KLUWER: EMP. L. DAILY,
http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/news/employees-cost-basedchallenge-to-arbitration-fails/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2020).
122. John Crawford, Going Dutch: Should Employees Have to Split the Costs
of Arbitration in Disputes Arising from Mandatory Arbitration AgreementsMorrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 280 (2004).
123. Nagele-Piazza, supra note 119, at 45 (indicating the fee cost via the
American Arbitration Association is often around $200 compared to the $350
filing fee in federal court).
124. Id. at 46.
125. Id.
126. Kimberly J. Mann, Comment, Constitutional Challenges to CourtOrdered Arbitration, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1055 (1997).
127. Lisa Spiwak, Forced Arbitration Violates Your Rights, PACIFIC COAST
BUSINESS
TIMES
(Jan.
15,
2016),
https://www.pacbiztimes.com/2016/01/15/forced-arbitration-violates-yourrights/; U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
128. Michael Peabody, Eliminating the Mandatory Trade-off: Should
Employees Have the Right to Choose Arbitration?, 1 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 107,
108 (2000).
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vein, in seeking employment, employees have the right to waive
their constitutional rights in order to secure employment.129 Thus, as
a matter of public policy, it would be wise for a business to balance
their exercise of constitutional rights alongside the rights of their
employees to ensure a more equitable experience for both parties.
Businesses should consider their position coming from a place of
superior bargaining power and the ways in which this might affect
contractual obligations between themselves and employees.
G. Arbitration as a Corporate Employer Shield
Another consideration for businesses when considering whether
to include arbitration agreements in their employment contracts is
the fact that for many years, arbitration has been used as a shield for
abusive employer practices. Title VII claims will be used as a
backdrop for the forthcoming analysis involving such abusive
employer practices. Some scholars argue that mandatory arbitration
may actually promulgate sexual harassment culture in the
workplace, and the same could be likely said for discrimination
culture, as this analysis will show, this tends to be the case.130
Our culture of constant connectivity means that most of the
nation is now acquainted with a growing intolerance of workplace
abuse, including sexual harassment in the wake of #MeToo. Such
misconduct in the workplace setting is pervasive in the U.S.
workplace, and in the past seven years alone, U.S. companies have
paid near $300 million in public penalties resulting from sexual
harassment claims brought by employees.131 Mandatory arbitration
may undermine protective laws such as Title VII, the law forbidding
sexual harassment in the workplace, by providing a shield from
negative publicity for employers by allowing them to secretly pay
out victims and brush harassment claims brought by employees.132
This effect does little to develop case law around employment Title
VII and discrimination claims, and instead allows businesses to
continue abusive practices for years until forced to litigate publicly
or until a victim breaks their settlement agreement.133
The very nature of arbitration occurring in a private conference
room rather than in a public court, as well as the financial difficulty
of receiving arbitrators’ decisions, combined with secret settlements
129. Id.
130. Levinson, supra note 108, at 504.
131. Id. at 505; Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment (Charges Filed with
EEOC) FY2010-FY2018, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (last visited
Jan.
12,
2020),
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual_harassment_new.cfm
(Jan. 14, 2018).
132. Id. at 509.
133. Id. at 511; see also Estlund, supra note 84, at 680.
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for victims of sexual harassment, showcases the need for a
resolution that will strike a balance between protecting employer
and employee interests.134 The “culture of secrecy” associated with
arbitration is attributable to confidentiality norms occurring in the
arbitration forum as well as amongst arbitrators.135 When utilizing
mandatory arbitration, employers face limited “reputational
sanctions,” which are often the most powerful deterrents to
questionable misconduct for many large businesses and firms.136
In order for businesses to be more ethically competent in the era
of #MeToo and beyond, it is important that they be forthright in their
mismanagement of misconduct and to display a sincere willingness
to address toxic corporate culture. Recently, an uptick in the
willingness to address decades-long patterns of toxicity has been
evidenced, as businesses are increasingly striving towards effective
resolutions of allegations of abuse.137
H. Mandatory Employment Arbitration May Stifle Discrimination
and Harassment Claims
Next, this article examines how mandatory arbitration may stifle
discrimination and harassment claims brought by employees, as
well as what type of employees are most often affected by these
agreements. Some critics view mandatory arbitration as less of an
“alternative dispute resolution” device and more of a “disappearing

134. Estlund, supra note 84, at 680.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 681.
137. Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Munger Tolles, Orrick to Scrap Employee
Arbitration Agreements, BLOOMBERG L.: BIG LAW BUS. (Mar. 26, 2018),
https://biglawbusiness.com/munger-tolles-orrick-to-scrap-employee-arbitrationagreements; Lisa Nagele-Piazza, Google Scraps Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements,
SHRM
(Feb.
22,
2019),
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/employmentlaw/pages/google-scraps-mandatory-arbitration-agreements.aspx;
Laharee
Chatterjee, Uber, Lyft Scrap Mandatory Arbitration for Sexual Assault Claims,
THOMSON
REUTERS:
BUS.
NEWS
(May
15,
2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uber-sexual-harassment/uber-lyft-scrapmandatory-arbitration-for-sexual-assault-claims-idUSKCN1IG1I2.;
Emily
Canal, Microsoft Will No Longer Require Employees to Settle Sexual Harassment
Cases Privately. Here’s Why It Matters for Your Company, INC. (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://www.inc.com/emily-canal/microsoft-forced-arbitration-sexualharassment.html; Davey Alba, et al., Square, Airbnb, and eBay Just Said They
Would End Forced Arbitration for Sexual Harassment Claims, BUZZFEED NEWS
(Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/daveyalba/techcompanies-end-forced-arbitration-airbnb-ebay; Staci Zaretsky, The First Biglaw
Firm to Willingly Do Away With Its Mandatory Arbitration Policy, ABOVE THE
LAW, (May 17, 2018), https://abovethelaw.com/2018/03/this-biglaw-firm-is-thefirst-to-step-forward-and-do-away-with-mandatory-arbitration-for-allemployees/.

100

MITCHELL HAMLINE L.J. PUB. POL’Y & PRAC.

[41

act” as it relates to employees’ claims against their employers.138
The secrecy and lack of transparency of many arbitration
proceedings make it difficult to conduct empirical research on
arbitration as it affects employees. 139 One empirical study by
Alexander Colvin on employment arbitration showed a startlingly
small number of arbitration filings. 140 It further found a strong
repeat employer effect; where employee win rates and award
amounts were lower where the arbitrator worked with the employer
before. 141 The data demonstrates the procedural difficulties of
arbitration, and potential inherent bias of repeat arbitrator-employer
pairings, as the practice itself often has the effect of stymieing
claims brought against employers, and reducing the damages
awarded.142
As to who is most often affected by arbitration agreements,
notably more than half of private-sector non-union workers are
subject to mandatory arbitration. 143 And while some employees
signed these agreements as a prerequisite to hiring, other businesses
adopted these arbitration procedures simply by announcing that
these procedures had been incorporated into the organization’s
employment policies. 144 As mentioned before, mandatory
arbitration is found in many industries and is often implemented by
large companies with many employees.145 A study by the Economic
Policy Institute estimated that 57.6% of female workers are subject
to mandatory arbitration, slightly higher than the rate for the overall
population, or 56.2%. 146 The study also estimated that 59.1% of
African American workers in all industries of the United States are
subject to mandatory arbitration, making African American workers
the most likely to be subject to mandatory arbitration among all
groups of workers identified. 147 Further, the EPI found that
employers with the lowest-paid workforces were the most likely to
impose mandatory arbitration.148 From a public policy standpoint,
this is incredibly unsettling, in light of the fact that the low-paid
work sector presents as a vulnerable segment of society, making

138. Estlund, supra note 84, at 682.
139. Id.
140. Alexander Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration: Case
Outcomes and Processes, Cornell Univ., ILR (last visited Oct. 12, 2019),
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/577.
141. Estlund, supra note 84, at 682.
142. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 4.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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them particularly susceptible to infringements on their employment
rights.149
Findings of gender and race-oriented arbitration outcomes
should come as nothing short of disturbing. 150 In yet another
empirical study conducted by Cornell University, researchers found
that within the securities industry, the gender of both the
complainant and the complainant’s attorney had significant negative
effects on the size of the award.151 Female complainants and female
complainant attorneys in arbitration proceedings generated less of
an award than their male counterparts.152 With all of these factors in
mind, as a matter of public policy it is absolutely pivotal for
employers to reconsider how they approach disputes with their
employees. Since the arbitration practice is already so prevalent and
convenient for employers as discussed in part III, infra, it is unlikely
that forced arbitration provisions will be disappearing anytime soon.
However, as outlined below, we can begin to shift the paradigm and
introduce best practices for businesses to incorporate for a more
even-handed approach that will serve to protect the interests of
employers and employees alike.
IV. BEST PRACTICES FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS AS IT RELATES TO
MANDATORY ARBITRATION IN THE EMPLOYMENT LAW CONTEXT
In light of the business benefits and ethical drawbacks of
including binding mandatory arbitration clauses in employment
contracts, this Section recommends best practices for business and
corporate lawyers to consider as they advise their clients and draft
contracts.
This Section presupposes that many employment contracts will
include arbitration agreements, and thus prescribes some procedural
and substantive mechanisms in order to make the contractual
agreements fairer to all parties and enforceable, when necessary.
There is a growing policy need to revise many employment
arbitration agreements as they exist or implement more sound
arbitration agreements if they are to continue being legal.153
149. Id; see Annette Benhardt, et al., Broken Laws, Unprotected Workers:
Violations of Employment and Labor Laws in America’s Cities, CTR. FOR URBAN
ECON. DEV., EMP. L. PROJECT, & UCLA INSTIT. FOR RES. ON LAB. & EMP. (2009),
https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/BrokenLawsReport2009.pdf.
150. David Lipsky, et al., The Effect of Gender on Awards in Employment
Arbitration Cases: The Experience in the Securities Industry, 52 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 1, 2 (2013).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Sen. Al Franken and Rep. Hank Johnson Lead Fight to End Unfair
Forced Arbitration Agreements, Press Release, HANK JOHNSON CONGRESSMAN
FOR
GEORGIA’S
4TH
DISTRICT
(May
7,
2017),
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Hank Johnson, the sponsor of the 2008 and 2009 versions of the
Arbitration Fairness Act, stated that “big business has . . . warped
and corrupted the arbitration process.” 154 And this may be an
accurate characterization in light of the scope of employment
arbitration and the historical pattern of enforceability.
In an effort to preserve some of the business benefits of
arbitration as discussed above, it is imperative for businesses and
their attorneys to change the way that arbitration agreements are
structured, in order for them to be conscionable, as well as ethically
fair to the large class of employees these agreements are enforceable
against.
In the words of Linda Sanchez, the Chair of the House
Commercial and Administrative Law Subcommittee of the Judiciary
Committee, “[t]o be a respected and reasonable alternative to the
courts, arbitration must provide a level and fair playing field.”155 If
implemented, arbitration should aim to provide faster, more
effective remedies for employees. 156 Arbitration, when used
correctly, should also allow the employee’s claim to be decided on
the legal merits, rather than being dismissed preemptively on a
motion by the employer’s lawyer before trial.157
A. Ensure that Employees Understand the Legal Effect of
Arbitration Clauses
The first best practice is to ensure that employees understand the
practical and legal consequences of signing an arbitration
agreement. An employer might not be able to compel arbitration of
an employment dispute if there is no valid assent to the
arbitration. 158 Assent is one of the fundamental elements of any
contract agreement. While each arbitration agreement will be
different depending on the company and the attorney drafting the
clause, it is worth the few minutes and extra explanatory
documentation given to the employee for them to understand what
rights they may be relinquishing by signing the agreement. This is
especially poignant because many arbitration agreements will be
enforceable under the FAA even if they are not signed.159

https://hankjohnson.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/sen-al-franken-andrep-hank-johnson-lead-fight-end-unfair-forced (include short history of AFA’s
legislative history).
154. Stacy Hickox, Article: Ensuring Enforceability and Fairness in The
Arbitration of Employment Disputes, 16 WIDENER L. REV. 101, 103 (2010).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 108.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 109.
159. Id. at 110; Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 507 F.3d 967, 974 (6th Cir.
2007).
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Corporate legal counsel should thoroughly train hiring managers
how to fully explain the intricacies of their arbitration agreements to
employees before the employees sign the employment contract. It is
recommended that the employee be given a copy of the arbitration
agreement as well as additional documentation that explains in plain
language what the effects of this agreement will be upon any future
disputes between the employee and the company.
B. Include Opt-Out Provisions
Business attorneys drafting these contracts on behalf of
employers may also want to consider drafting opt-out provisions,
which allow the employees to continue working at the company
despite having opted out of an arbitration agreement. Another type
of opt-out provision could give the employee the option, for a
contractually agreed period of time, to opt-out of arbitration after
originally “opting-in.”
The large tech company, Uber, utilizes opt-out provisions in
their arbitration agreements and has seen success in ensuing
litigation as a result.160 Opt-out provisions may mitigate the unequal
bargaining power concerns discussed above and promote
enforceability of the contract where necessary.161 In Suarez v. Uber
Techs, Inc., the court granted Uber’s motion to compel arbitration in
an employment dispute which involved a ‘click-through’ service
agreement and an opt-out arbitration provision.162
The opt-out provision crafted by Uber emphasized that
arbitration is an important business decision and that the employee
should not rely solely on the information in the agreement in order
to understand the consequences of arbitration.163
As a matter of law, the Suarez court held that there was no
procedural unconscionability because the plaintiffs had the absolute
right to opt-out of the arbitration provision of the agreement.164 The
court reasoned that even though the plaintiffs had less bargaining
power, the plaintiffs would also be allowed to reject the arbitration
160. Suarez v. Uber Techs., Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59421, *5 (M.D. Fla.
May 4, 2016).
161. Id.; see also Brian Berkley, Can Opt-Out Provisions Save Arbitration
Clauses?,
LAW360
(June
8,
2016),
https://advance.lexis.com/document/?pdmfid=1000516&crid=2e983dc4-6c434df7-b94b0d909c3c6dd0&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fanalyticalmaterials%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A5JYN-V8S1-DXHD-G53T-0000000&pddocid=urn%3AcontentItem%3A5JYN-V8S1-DXHD-G53T-0000000&pdcontentcomponentid=122100&pdteaserkey=sr5&pditab=allpods&ecomp
=wpnqk&earg=sr5&prid=e43857c4-b9dd-4121-bbdd-2035dcd3494c&cbc=0.
162. Suarez, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59421, at *1.
163. Id. at *5.
164. Id. at *12.
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provision with no consequence to the relationship with the
corporation.165
Uber also required that the Uber drivers digitally confirm that
they read the arbitration agreement not once, but twice. 166 This
confirmation is especially poignant in the tech-age, encouraging
employees to understand that they may opt out of these provisions
and to not speed through the agreement process, especially when the
signatures are electronic. This is key in light of the fact that an optout provision alone, which may be inconspicuous, will not always
save an arbitration agreement from being ruled unconscionable.167
C. Consider Excluding Certain Claims Subject to Mandatory
Arbitration
In light of the policy discussions made earlier, when drafting
binding mandatory arbitration agreements in employment contracts,
business attorneys may want to consider careful drafting and
consider excluding certain claims from binding arbitration.
In light of recent National Labor Relations Board decisions,
drafters should be sure that they don’t include language that may
interfere with employees’ rights to place complaints with the
NLRB. 168 Doing so will likely render the arbitration provision
unenforceable as unlawfully interfering with employees’ rights.
Along with this consideration, drafters of arbitration clauses
might consider excluding claims of sexual harassment and sexual
assault from binding arbitration, as a policy consideration in the
light of the #MeToo movement. 169 In the era of #MeToo, many
companies are facing criticism where they compel claims of sexual
harassment into private arbitration.170 Companies have announced
that they will no longer compel arbitration of these claims, and
ethically this seems to be the smartest move for businesses in terms
of policy and public relations.171 While many courts may maintain
165. Id. at *12.
166. Berkley, supra note 161.
167. Hickox, supra note 154, at 102–174.
168. Samantha Bononno, et al., Employers Dealt a Blow by Labor Board
Decision on Arbitration Agreements, SHRM (June 20, 2019),
https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/employmentlaw/pages/labor-board-decision-on-arbitration-agreements.aspx (the National
Labor Relations Board recently issued a unanimous decision which invalidated an
employer’s mandatory arbitration agreement that could be reasonably interpreted
as potentially preventing employees from filing charges with the board).
169. Paul Cowie, et al., #MeToo Changes the Face of Sexual Harassment
Litigation for Employers, LAB. & EMP. L. BLOG (Nov. 19, 2018),
https://www.laboremploymentlawblog.com/2018/11/articles/arbitrationagreements/metoo-sexual-harassment-confidentiality-clause/.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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that sexual harassment and assault claims remain arbitrable under
the law and the broad breadth of the FAA, as a matter of policy,
business lawyers should consider this exclusion.172
V. CONCLUSION
Given the current legal environment in the U.S., the status of the
Supreme Court’s holdings on mandatory arbitration in employment
law, and the current make-up of the current Supreme Court, it is no
surprise that so many large businesses are utilizing employment
arbitration.
A 2008 survey of corporate counsel performed by Fulbright and
Jaworski found that out of the 251 corporate participants in the U.S.,
75% had company-mandated arbitration of employment disputes in
a non-union setting.173 The EPI recently reported that 56% of nonunion private-sector employees are currently held to mandatory
individual arbitration procedures. 174 Industries implementing
mandatory arbitration include: education, healthcare, business
services, information, and retail. As a general rule, the more
employees a corporation has, the more likely it is to use mandatory
arbitration.175
Businesses are keen to understand that there is “safety in
numbers.” The current trend of employers requiring mandatory
arbitration has resulted in an industry-wide domino effect,
influencing others to follow suit. 176 Survey data from EPI
demonstrates that among large employers who require mandatory
arbitration, they have only started adopting it as readily within the
last five years. 177 In fact, 43.5% of these large establishments
surveyed, with over 100 employees, have adopted binding
mandatory arbitration within the last five years. At least in the U.S.,
the more employees a corporation has, the higher likelihood of
mandatory arbitration is utilized. 178 Sixty seven percent of the
companies surveyed by the EPI in the U.S. workplace, who had over
5,000 employees, hold those employees to mandatory arbitration

172. Eric Koplowitz, “I Didn’t Agree To Arbitrate That!”- How Courts
Determine If Employees’ Sexual Assault And Sexual Harassment Claims Fall
Within The Scope Of Broad Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 13 CARDOZO J. OF
CONFLICT RESOL. 565, 566 (2012).
173. Coleman, supra note 76.
174. Jaclyn Diaz, More Employers Turn to Arbitration to Handle Job Claims,
BLOOMBERG
L.:
DAILY
LAB.
REP.
(Dec.
6,
2018),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/more-employers-turn-toarbitration-to-handle-job-claims.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 4.
178. Id.
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procedures. 179 The EPI attributes these numbers to the fact that
larger organizations have more sophisticated human resource
policies and better legal counsel and are more likely to adopt
mandatory arbitration in order to better shield themselves against
legal liability.180
Considering the rise of arbitration usage in the employment law
context, employers and their attorneys must understand how to
ethically and effectively utilize alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms to resolve employment disputes. Business benefits, as
well as potential ethical drawbacks of utilizing binding arbitration
in the workplace should be weighed and allocated differently
depending on the size of the business, the scope of the business, and
the type of employee relationships it utilizes.
It is becoming increasingly important for businesses to be
transparent and publicly responsible concerning their treatment of
employees, so while utilizing arbitration may work efficiently for
some claims, it may not always be the best solution for every claim
an employee may bring. Employment arbitration continues to allow
for quick, economical dispute resolution and when employed
ethically and thoughtfully, will continue to be an efficient vehicle
for employment dispute claims.

179. Id.
180. Id.
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